Variations in Cost for Magnetic Resonance Imaging Scans Based on Certificate of Need Regulations by Hall, Andrew M.
Medical University of South Carolina 
MEDICA 
MUSC Theses and Dissertations 
2019 
Variations in Cost for Magnetic Resonance Imaging Scans Based 
on Certificate of Need Regulations 
Andrew M. Hall 
Medical University of South Carolina 
Follow this and additional works at: https://medica-musc.researchcommons.org/theses 
Recommended Citation 
Hall, Andrew M., "Variations in Cost for Magnetic Resonance Imaging Scans Based on Certificate of Need 
Regulations" (2019). MUSC Theses and Dissertations. 213. 
https://medica-musc.researchcommons.org/theses/213 
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by MEDICA. It has been accepted for inclusion in 































A doctoral project submitted to the faculty of the Medical University of South Carolina in 
partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree Doctor of Health Administration in 
the College of Health Professions 
 
 













First, I’d like to thank my committee members, starting with Dr. Kit Simpson. 
She was responsible for helping me determine my overall topic back in Advanced 
Techniques in Applied Research and then narrowing it down to the actual analysis we 
performed in the study. She was also instrumental in helping me track down some of the 
more difficult data elements like the Regional Price Parity. Without her assistance, the 
analysis would never have achieved the level of detail it did and the implications would 
not be as meaningful. 
 Dr. Simpson was also the one who recommended I work with Professor Mike 
Meacham. He provided unique insight into the project as a former legislator and with 
certificate of need, having lead Connecticut’s program. Without his contributions, the 
project would not have as through an exploration nor explanation of the background and 
spread of certificate of need and all the legal intricacies that come along with it. 
 I had the privilege of working with not one lawyer, but two: Mike and the final 
member of my committee, Ryan Blackledge. Ryan brought not just his experience 
working with the North Carolina General Assembly and how to shape public policy, but 
also a keen insight into additional questions the analysis could investigate. He is 
responsible for making sure we were as through as possible. For all of the 




 I would not have entered into this program were it not for Robin Voss, Melissa 
Shearer, and Deno Adkins. None of them had known me for a tremendous amount of 
time, but they must have seen some potential when they wrote recommendation letters for 
my application. I hope through this process I have realized some of that potential. 
 To my parents, thank you for supporting me along this journey. At times it has 
meant having to go off and work when you would visit because I needed to read a journal 
article or do research on the methodology, but I hope that time was well spent and now I 
will not have any more homework to worry about. 
Thanks to everyone at Cone Health who has supported me throughout this 
process. Whether it be a willingness to wait a few more days for a response because I was 
in Charleston or checking in on my progress towards finishing this project, it has been 
much appreciated. 
Finally, to everyone who has told me throughout the years that I will never be a 





























s/ Kit N. Simpson                   4/25/19 
Chair, Project Committee       Kit N. Simpson, DrPH         Date 
 
 
s/ Michael R. Meacham                  4/25/19 
Member, Project Committee       Michael R. Meacham, JD, MPH      Date 
 
 
s/ Ryan Blackledge                   4/24/19 











Abstract of Doctoral Project Report Presented to the 
Executive Doctoral Program in Health Administration and Leadership 
Medical University of South Carolina 
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the  
Degree of Doctor of Health Administration 
 
 





Andrew M. Hall 
 
Chairperson: Kit N. Simpson, DrPH  
Committee: Michael R. Meacham, JD, MPH 
  Ryan Blackledge, JD, MBA 
 
 
To help control rising healthcare costs, states implemented certificate of need 
(CON) programs to prevent unnecessary duplication of healthcare resources. Today, 37 
states and the District of Colombia have some form of CON. The scope of CON 
oversight varies between states, but most states have some type of regulation for MRI 
scanners, whether it be a direct requirement applicable to all MRI scanner projects or an 
indirect requirement that may only impact some MRI scanner projects. The study 
analyzed retrospective commercial billing data for over 275,000 encounters to quantify 
differences in costs for MRI scans in each state according to the type of CON 
requirements for MRI scanners. When the data were aggregated only by type of CON 




0.0001) followed by indirectly regulated states (p-value < 0.0001) with unregulated states 
having the highest mean payment amounts. When only state mean payment amounts 
were considered, the variance was not significant. Based on these results, CON programs 
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Healthcare costs have been growing in the United States for decades. Healthcare 
spending has increased from 5% of gross GDP in 1960 to almost 17% in 2012 with even 
more growth in spending projected from provisions related to the Affordable Care Act 
(ACA) (Chen, Liang, & Lin, 2016). Even though the future of the ACA is unknown due 
to the current political climate, healthcare costs are still a prominent issue for both federal 
and state governments. One method that state governments have employed to control 
healthcare costs are Certificate of Need (CON) laws. 
CON regulations have been in existence since the 1970s. These regulations 
stemmed primarily from a federal law passed in 1974. The National Health Planning and 
Resources Development Act of 1974 (NHPRDA) provided the framework for states to 
establish oversight of healthcare resources and distribution. One area of oversight 
specified in the act was a requirement that duplicative health services be prohibited. The 
most common way states complied with this provision was through implementation of 
CON statutes. CON laws regulate the manner in which healthcare providers can offer or 
expand services by requiring providers to seek governmental approval prior to putting 
new services (as defined in statute) or pieces of equipment governed by CON regulations 
into use. NHPRDA was eventually repealed, but this action did not directly impact state 




Currently, 37 states along with the District of Columbia, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and 
Puerto Rico have some form of CON or similar law (Cauchi & Noble, 2016). The scope 
of these statutes vary by state with some only governing hospital projects and others 
regulating a wide variety of medical practices and services. This wide range of legislation 
across the states leads to differing requirements for MRI scanners. Some states have 
specific language regarding MRI equipment while others have spending thresholds that 
may or may not apply to MRI projects depending on the capital cost. These typically 
encompass either major medical equipment provisions (a requirement to gain CON 
approval for pieces of equipment that exceed a threshold) or overall spending caps. As 
such, there is no consistency between states for MRI scanners and CON programs. 
In some states where there are CON regulations pertaining specifically to MRI, 
there are additional requirements that must be met in order to apply for permission to 
acquire the piece of equipment. In North Carolina, for example, the North Carolina State 
Health Coordinating Council (SHCC), a gubernatorial advisory body, must include a 
need determination for an MRI scanner in the annual North Carolina State Medical 
Facilities Plan (SMFP) in order for there to be any CON reviews possible for MRI 
scanners. There is a mathematical formula in the SMFP to determine need based on 
historical utilization and projected population growth. Moreover, there is an additional 
annual comment period for potential applicants to request the inclusion or removal of a 
need determination if any person believes the mathematical formula did not take 
extenuating circumstances into account. These additional requirements exist to ensure the 




One main tenet of CON programs is to control healthcare costs; however, few 
studies examine CON’s impact on cost. This study will provide information on the 
efficacy of CON regulations pertaining to MRI scans in controlling costs. Most studies 
focusing on the impact of CON relate to inpatient services or other pieces of equipment 
that are primarily used in the hospital setting. MRI scanners are located in both hospitals 
as well as freestanding imaging centers and physician offices, leading to a different 
setting of care than previous studies explored. Prior studies around MRI scanners and 
cost have shown variation in cost based on geographic location, but these studies did not 
take the presence of CON regulations into account (Pasalic, Lingineni, Cloft, & Kallmes, 
2015). 
Problem Statement 
This research aims to verify whether CON regulations achieve the stated goal of 
containing costs. The purpose of this study is to determine whether or not CON 
regulations cause variation in cost for MRI scans, one of the imaging modalities that is 
commonly governed by CON programs. If there is a variation based on CON legislation, 
the study will further attempt to quantify the directionality of the difference, e.g. whether 
the costs are higher or lower in CON regulated states compared to those without CON 
regulations. 
Research Questions and Research Hypotheses 
The study will aim to answer two basic questions regarding the relationship 
between CON regulation and the costs of MRI scans. First, is there variation in cost for 
MRI scans in states where MRI scanners are explicitly regulated compared to CON 




states? Second, if there is a difference, are costs higher or lower in MRI regulated CON 
states compared to non-CON states and non-MRI specific CON states?  
The null hypothesis for both research questions is that the costs for MRI scans are 
the same across all three defined groups or H0: CostDirect = CostIndirect = CostNone where 
CostDirect represents cost for the states where MRI is specifically regulated by CON 
programs, CostIndirect is the cost in states where CON regulations do not directly govern 
MRI projects, but rather have overarching requirements that MRI projects may fall into; 
and CostNone is the cost for states where MRI is not directly or indirectly addressed by 
CON programs, and states that do not have CON statutes. The alternative hypothesis is 
H1: CostDirect ≠ CostIndirect ≠ CostNone. The second research question can only be addressed 
if the null hypothesis for the first question is disproven. If there is a difference, the null 
hypothesis for the second question will be that costs in states with directly applicable 
CON requirements will be higher than those states with indirectly applicable 
requirements and both of those will be higher than the costs in states without any CON 
restrictions on MRI projects. Stated numerically, this would be H0: CostDirect > CostIndirect 
> CostNone. There are multiple alternative hypotheses to disprove the null hypothesis. 
Population 
The population for this study includes any adult who received an MRI scan in the 
United States during 2016 with some exceptions. Pediatric patients are being excluded 
from this study for a variety of factors, including the increased utilization of sedation 
during MRI procedures which is not consistent with clinical practice patterns for adults. 
Additionally, the claim must have a cost greater than $0.00 to rule out coding error that 




necessary variables to properly group the claim including an MRI procedure code and 
state. 
Assumptions 
 The study assumes that the administrative billing data are an accurate 
representation of the actual procedures performed. Billing data, or claims data, are 
secondary data sources. These secondary data are administrative data and are not 
designed for research use. Because administrative data are not collected explicitly for 
research purposes, there may be a lack of standardization in the application of coding 
procedures (Shi, 2008). For this study, we will assume that all data in the dataset are valid 
and coded in a standard manor. This means that we assume that all procedures performed 
are recorded and included in the dataset and that each coded procedure is the same as the 













Peer-reviewed journal articles were sourced from Ovid/MEDLINE as 
accessed through the Medical University of South Carolina (MUSC) Library. In the event 
an article sourced through Ovid/MEDLINE was not available through the MUSC Library 
holdings, the Greensboro Area Health Education Center (GAHEC) Library provided a 
full text copy of the article of interest. Search terms in Ovid/MEDLINE included 
“Certificate of Need,” “Cost,” “Radiology and Cost,” and “MRI and Cost.” Results were 
limited to articles written in English and those pertaining to the United States. Since CON 
is governed by legal statutes, a search of law reviews was conducted through the 
American Bar Association’s Legal Technical Resource Center. “Certificate of Need” was 
used as the search term in this query. 
Certificate of Need 
 Development and Evolution. Once CON regulations came into effect, legal 
scholars began analyzing their impact. During the 1960’s and 1970’s, healthcare 
spending increased exponentially and CON was a mechanism by which states hoped to 
control expenditures. An early analysis of spending in states where CON existed prior to 
passage of NHPRDA found healthcare spending was still accelerating at a higher rate 
than the general inflation rate, bringing the efficacy of CON into question even before its 




in CON decisions and even the necessity to obtain a CON for a project. The makeup of 
the statewide body overseeing CON also varies and the involvement of multiple agencies 
in the review process can lead to pro forma approval due to the lack of clarity over 
ultimate authority (Schonbrun, 1979). Despite these variations, there were commonalities 
between most of the laws. For example, every state except Oklahoma required a CON for 
construction of a new hospital. States also typically require that an application for a CON 
be submitted on a form devised by the body by which the application will be reviewed. 
Most states initially allowed the review to be completed by a local planning agency, but 
most states have now returned control to a statewide department (Haighurst, 1973), 
(Cauchi & Noble, 2016). The intent for these local agencies, called Health System 
Agencies (HSAs) as defined in P.L. 93-641, was to allow community and local 
government input before granting initial approval of the application and forwarding the 
application to the statewide agency. These HSAs were required under NHPRDA with 
approval from the state’s governor and could be an existing body, such as a local 
government agency, or a new corporation formed for the express purpose of reviewing 
local CON applications (Roos, 1987). Some states sought to decrease the amount of time 
it took to review applications and implemented policies allowing simultaneous review by 
both the HSA and state agency (Schonbrun, 1979). 
Proponents of CON programs point to increased planning the CON process 
required before initiating a project as a way to ensure hospitals and other healthcare 
providers completed sufficient studies and projections (Schonbrun, 1979). Proponents 
also point to regulations on other non-hospital industries, like utility companies, that are 




expenditures and activities. This type of regulation already existed in the healthcare 
industry with health insurance companies having to submit rate increases to insurance 
departments (Haighurst, 1973). 
Opponents of CON point to a variety of problems. First, when programs were 
initially developed, there was no transparency into the process. Broad statewide statutes 
governed the process; however, the application of statutory authority wasn’t always 
carried out equally even within the same state by the local planning agencies (Haighurst, 
1973). Second, when programs came into existence, projects in progress were exempt 
from applying for a CON. These limited time exemptions led some hospitals to move 
forward with projects ahead of schedule as to avoid the necessity of obtaining a CON 
(Schonbrun, 1979). 
 In 1986, Congress repealed the federal requirement for statewide planning and 
CON programs under NHPRDA. States were then able to make changes to their CON 
requirements or end them completely. By the time of repeal, researchers found multiple 
examples of healthcare providers legally circumventing the law. Roos (1987) lists various 
entities across the country avoiding CON review by using shell corporations to share 
costs, working with exempt entities (including physician groups), and splitting the project 
into multiple, smaller components. The denial rate for projects was also low, around ten 
percent, potentially confirming Schonbrun’s conclusion about decision rights not being 
clearly assigned to one specific agency. 
 Even though the federal requirement for CON programs was repealed, the federal 
government still provides input on the need for statewide planning and healthcare 




(FTC) issued a letter to South Carolina Governor Nikki Haley regarding the South 
Carolina CON program. Governor Haley attempted to end South Carolina’s CON 
program by vetoing the funding from the state budget, but the South Carolina Supreme 
Court ruled she did not have authority to end a program based in statute (Sausser, 2013), 
(Burris, 2014). Despite the ruling, Governor Haley still sought to end the program and 
asked for input from the federal government on a bill in the South Carolina General 
Assembly that would repeal the CON statutes. In the letter, the DOJ and FTC recommend 
that South Carolina either narrow or repeal its CON laws to enhance competition. The 
agencies posit CON programs restrict new entrants to the market that may offer more cost 
effective options or provide pressure to lower prices simply by adding another competitor 
(Lao & Potter, 2016). 
The FTC independently issued a similar opinion to a North Carolina legislator on 
a bill that would have removed certain institutional health services from the purview of 
CON regulations in 2015. The FTC supported HB 200, a bill to exempt operating rooms, 
psychiatric beds, and certain radiology facilities from the CON program. In its letter, the 
FTC stated that its purpose in supporting the proposed legislation is to increase 
competition and remover barriers from access to care. The FTC also opposed CON 
regulations on the basis that they bolster the market share of existing facilities unfairly 
and protect them from competition from additional entrants in the market (Lao, 
Lafontaine, & Feinstein, 2015). Ultimately, as discussed later, the bill did not pass and 
those services remain a part of North Carolina’s CON program. 
More recently, the United States Secretaries of Health and Human Services, 




an Executive Order. This report built on the previously expressed views of the FTC and 
DOJ to reach similar conclusions, primarily around antitrust issues surrounding hospital 
mergers (Azar, Mnuchin, & Acosta, 2018). One of the recommendations of this report is 
that CON programs end the ability of opponents of a CON application to comment on 
pending applications. This would, in theory, aim to award more certificates by curtailing 
any negative discussion of the project. The Secretaries also recommend states end their 
CON programs, though that decision ultimately lies with the states. 
Impact. Many studies assess the impact of CON regulations on a variety of 
different services, but most focus on those services delivered in an acute care hospital 
setting. In 1998, Conover and Sloan investigated whether the repeal of CON regulations 
led to increased spending. Their findings indicated that the presence of CON laws did 
limit hospital spending, but that CON programs resulted in higher costs per inpatient day. 
There was no impact on cost to the patient or on total healthcare spending. Their 
conclusion was when CON laws were repealed, some services shifted from hospital to 
other ambulatory settings. These shifts resulted in higher costs for hospital days as fixed 
costs were spread over fewer discharges, but there was no reduction in per capita cost as 
there was simply a shift in site of service. The authors noted that proportion of inpatient 
beds in the for-profit hospital sector relative to the overall supply of inpatient increased 
after CON laws were repealed, which may also account for the overall increase in 
hospital charges for acute care services.  
In New York, literature shows there has been a steady outmigration of services 
from the hospital with the notable exception of MRI services (Berliner, 2008). Berliner 




technology, efforts to keep patients out of the hospital, and growing employment of 
physicians by hospitals and health systems. Hospital employment of physicians allows 
physicians to access the financial resources of the hospital to equip their practices and 
facilities. Berliner hypothesizes the main reasons MRI services have not followed this 
outmigration pattern are twofold. First, New York initially limited the number of MRI 
scanners available across the state mainly to hospitals. Second, physicians could not bill 
for a facility fee – or additional reimbursement paid to hospitals to offset increased 
overhead – if they owned MRI scanners within their own offices. This decreased 
reimbursement made it much less financially viable for a private physician practice to 
purchase an MRI scanner. 
Emergency departments are another example of a service that is regulated by 
CON programs in some states. Opponents of CON regulation of emergency departments 
argue the restriction on expansion of emergency services artificially constricts the supply 
of emergency department beds and can lead to longer stays as there are fewer beds to 
treat less acute patients while more critical patients hold for admission or surgery. Studies 
indicate that states with CON regulations for emergency departments have a shorter 
length of stay in the emergency department compared to states that do not regulate such 
services; however, the literature does not rule out the possibility that some other factor 
could be at play beyond the presence or absence of CON programs (Paul, Ni, & Bagchi, 
2014). 
Conclusions relative to the impact of CON on surgical services are mixed at best. 
Studies examine the extent to which CON laws effect surgical training programs. The 




medical centers, thereby improving the ability of surgical residents to learn new 
procedures (Fric-Shamji & Shamji, 2010). Other studies have found that CON 
regulations are not particularly effective at containing emerging surgical techniques. In 
examining linkages between CON regulations and the adoption of robotic equipment for 
use in urological surgery, researchers found there was not a relationship between CON 
regulation and purchases of robotic equipment. The researchers hypothesized various 
reasons why such a relationship might not exist, including the desire from the state 
agencies to have cutting edge equipment available to their citizens and the relatively 
minimal financial barrier posed by a CON application compared to the capital cost of the 
robotic equipment itself (Jacobs et al., 2013). 
Studies also investigate the impact to a specific area within the hospital: 
neonatology units. While there has been research on the impact CON programs have on 
hospital services overall, there is not much literature pertaining to pediatric or neonatal 
services. In total, 30 states have CON laws regarding the provision of neonatology 
services. In those states, there are fewer neonatal units with the most advanced 
capabilities when compared to states without CON programs. This aligns with other 
findings of CON programs leading to fewer acute care beds; however, the supply of 
neonatal beds is lower on average than the number of adult beds. This leads the authors to 
the conclude CON programs are more restrictive on neonatal services than on general 
hospital services (Lorch, Maheshwari, & Even-Shoshan, 2012). 
Certificate of need laws also regulate services outside of the hospital. A number 
of states’ CON regulations apply to nursing home beds and home health agencies, two 




the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) transitioned to a DRG based 
payment system as hospitals were financially incentivized to discharge patients as soon as 
medically possible. Rahman et al. (2016) found that the presence of CON laws kept 
Medicare spending higher for nursing homes than home health agencies compared to 
states where there were no CON regulations. In non-CON states, home health spending 
grew more rapidly than nursing home spend. 
CON Repeal and Reform Efforts 
 Federal. To help combat the perceived weaknesses of the CON system, numerous 
proposals for reform on a national scale arose. First, President Carter suggested that there 
should be capital spending caps at micro and macro levels. He sought a national cap on 
healthcare capital expenditures in total while also limiting individual hospitals from 
increasing their costs over a benchmark amount. This would force hospitals to be 
rigorous with their cost estimates and add another factor to CON agency decisions. The 
agencies would have to weigh the necessity of spending money for the proposed project 
in opposition to potential future projects, thereby making CON decisions more rigorous 
(Schonbrun, 1979). This proposal ultimately never went into effect. 
 States. There have been multiple attempts to amend and/or repeal CON laws in 
multiple states in recent years. Bills have been filed for the explicit purpose of ending 
CON programs, but have also been attached to other bills as amendments.   
In 2013, the North Carolina General Assembly tried to amend CON laws. House 
Bill 177 aimed to remove certain categories of service from the existing CON 
regulations. Specifically, House Bill 177 would exempt diagnostic centers (i.e. imaging 




from the need determination process. Any entity attempting to license an ASC would not 
have needed a CON as long as the license application was postmarked prior to December 
31, 2013. This exemption would have allowed physicians and other parties interested in 
establishing ASCs an opportunity to do so without being required to wait for a need 
determination or compete with other applicants for a determined need. The bill was 
passed by the House and forwarded to the Senate where it was not considered by the 
Committee on Rules and Operations of the Senate prior to the end of the session.  
In 2015, the South Carolina General Assembly tried to repeal the state’s CON 
program. House Bill 3250 would have, along with other changes to programs under the 
Department of Health and Environmental Control, repealed the CON statutes as of 
January 1, 2018. The House passed the bill nearly unanimously with a vote of 103-1; 
however, the Senate never voted on the final version of the bill that came out of the 
Senate’s Medical Affairs committee (Worthington, 2016). As such, the bill died and was 
never enacted, but as discussed earlier, South Carolina continued to try different ways to 
end its CON program with Governor Haley’s funding veto. 
In 2018, the Florida Legislature attempted to remove hospitals from the purview 
of its CON program, but would have left other facilities, such as nursing homes, subject 
to CON requirements. The House Bill, HB 27, passed the House 72-36 and was referred 
to the Senate (Millsap, 2018). The Florida Senate never placed the identical Senate bill 
(SB 1492) on the calendar and it died in the Senate in March 2018. These bills passed by 
at least one chamber of state legislature demonstrate the interest of state governments in 




Repeals. While many states have made unsuccessful efforts to pass legislation to 
repeal CON statutes, some states have passed bills to end their CON programs. New 
Hampshire passed legislation in 2012 to wind down its CON program by 2016 (Sanders, 
2016). Prior to New Hampshire, the last state to completely repeal its CON legislation 
was Indiana in 1999 (Schencker, 2016); however, in 2018 Indiana reinstituted CON for 
nursing home beds as a way to end a moratorium on adding incremental beds to its 
inventory. This plan to end the CON program was germinated by the desire to allow a 
for-profit cancer hospital to open a new facility in the state. This new hospital could not 
open under the New Hampshire CON program. New Hampshire’s legislation was a 
model for other states’ repeal efforts by including a gradual shut down of the CON 
program. This time allows existing and potential future providers to prepare for the end 
of regulation. While the CON program formally ended in 2016, there was a stopgap 
measure put in place to protect rural hospitals and the expansion of certain technologies 
(Sanders, 2016). This new requirement does not have the requirement for a CON, but 
rather permission from the state Department of Health and Human Services. 
Cost of Healthcare 
General. Healthcare in the United States has traditionally been costly. In the 
1960s, consumer spending for healthcare accounted for just 5% of annual GDP in the 
United States. By 2012, spending increased to 16.9% of GDP due in part to changes in 
market forces and continued governmental spending on healthcare programs. According 
to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the amount of 
healthcare spending in the United States is nearly twice the average spend of other 




exceeds the growth of other industries in the United States as well as the inflation rate of 
the dollar. 
Early on, CON programs were not effective in controlling the increase in 
healthcare inflation. After the passage of NHPRDA, healthcare inflation, and hospital 
expenditures, continued to outpace the general inflation rate (Schonbrun, 1979). In fact, 
in 1976, healthcare spending was already up to 8.7% of the United States GDP (Roos, 
1987). Seemingly the only aspect that CON regulations were able to contain was hospital 
bed growth which did slow after the passage of NHPRDA (Schonbrun, 1979). The 
slowed rate of bed growth came as hospitals increased capital expenditures on technology 
and other facility improvements in lieu of simply adding inpatient bed capacity, so 
overall hospital spending was not constrained by CON regulations (Salkever & Bice, 
1976). 
Era of Affordable Care Act. The ACA was passed by the 111th United States 
Congress and signed into law by President Barack Obama on March 23, 2010. One of the 
main tenets of the legislation was to decrease costs for patients for both coverage and 
treatment. One mechanism for this cost containment was the establishment of insurance 
marketplaces and a mandate that all Americans have some form of insurance coverage or 
pay a penalty. The authors of the law intended to expand access to insurance for 
consumers. By doing so, patients should seek more preventative care before conditions 
escalate to the need for emergency care, thus removing unnecessary cost from the 
healthcare delivery system.  
Initial studies indicate that the ACA is significantly impacting the out of pocket 




contains a list of covered benefits that are considered an essential part of healthcare. As 
such, insurance companies must cover the cost of these services at no out of pocket cost 
to the patient. Studies show access is increasing to some of these services (Bearak et al., 
2016). The use of intrauterine devices (IUD) as a form of contraception was previously a 
costly method compared to other forms of birth control, particularly oral contraceptives, 
as IUDs require many more visits and a minor procedure to insert and later remove the 
device. Prior to the ACA, patients would have been required to share in these costs in the 
form of copayments, deductibles, or co-insurance. Those costs have been eliminated 
since the implementation of the ACA (Bearak et al., 2016). The study does not address 
the overall cost to the system at a macro level; however, the ACA also caps the premiums 
that patients must pay for coverage. As such, out of pocket costs have fallen from 11.5% 
of healthcare spending in 2011 to 10.5% in 2017 (Martin, Hartman, Washington, & 
Catlin, 2019). 
Screening colonoscopies are another form of preventive care where ACA 
provisions require insurance plans to cover the service at no cost to patients. If, however, 
there are additional procedures performed during the same visit or the colonoscopy is not 
a screening colonoscopy, then the normal insurance provisions apply. In an effort to 
reduce the cost of both covered and non-covered costs for colonoscopies, physicians have 
pursued two options: bundled payments and reference pricing.  
Bundled payments exist for a variety of procedures, mostly surgical, in an effort 
to better coordinate care for patients. In a bundled payment arrangement, the payor will 
make one lump sum payment for all of the services associated with the procedure from 




rendering services during the episode of care to ensure that their fees do not exceed what 
the bundled payment will cover. For colonoscopies, the biggest variability in cost was the 
anesthesia fee.  By authorizing only one payment, the payors eliminate the variability 
from anesthesia fees from their area of responsibility and pass it along to the rendering 
physician or facility to manage.  
Reference pricing is another technique that payors use to decrease the variation in 
pricing for procedures. Under reference pricing, the payor places an upper limit on the 
covered amount for a certain procedure. If the patient opts for a procedure at a higher 
price than the reference price, the insurance company will not provide any reimbursement 
for the excess cost, leaving the patient with all of the responsibility for the difference 
(Lieberman & Allen, 2015). While these studies explicitly referred to colonoscopies for 
cost control, they can be applied to a wide variety of procedures. 
While the insurance exchanges were one example of how health insurance 
changed as a result of the ACA, employer provided health insurance also changed. Prior 
to the ACA, most businesses had no requirement to provide health insurance to their 
employees and were under no obligation to ensure the adequacy of those plans (Blavin, 
Shartzer, Long, & Holahan, 2015). Now, employers with more than 50 full time 
equivalent (FTE) employees must provide comprehensive coverage or face fines from the 
federal government. While most large businesses could comply with this requirement, 
small businesses were at a disadvantage from the high cost of providing insurance. As a 
response, the federal government established a small business health insurance 
marketplace similar to the state run exchanges for individuals. The idea behind this 




insurers due to increased scale. All of these efforts, however, seem to have had no effect 
on the adoption of employer sponsored coverage (Blavin et al., 2015).  
CON and Cost. Once CON programs were in place, policy makers were hesitant 
to end the programs for fear of unchecked spending in two fronts: initial capital 
investment and increased charges to generate a return on investment for those capital 
purchases. First, there was concern that hospitals and other providers would purchase 
new equipment that would have been regulated and that they would begin construction 
projects to house new services that they were previously prevented from offering under 
CON regulations. These pent-up projects would require a tremendous amount of capital 
that organizations would expect a substantial return on in order to fund further capital 
purchases. One way to ensure return would be to raise prices on those new services. This 
would have the effect of driving up healthcare spending as a result of the unchecked 
capital spending (Conover & Sloan, 1998). 
Conover and Sloan examined these potential problems by looking at states that 
had previously repealed CON laws and compared spending and costs to those states that 
still had CON programs in effect. Their findings were mixed. First, they found that there 
was not a bolus of capital spending in states that repealed their CON programs. This 
could indicate that CON programs do not have any impact on capital spending. Next, 
they found states with mature CON programs actually did have statistically significantly 
lower acute care spending compared to programs without CON laws. However, overall 
spending was statistically equivalent when ambulatory and other non-hospital costs are 
added to the calculation. This result indicates that CON programs in a vacuum are not 




delivery system not in the purview of CON regulations. These programs, though, do have 
some impact on cost for hospital services that are regulated. Of note, though not 
statistically significant, the study did indicate that when states repealed their CON 
regulations, both hospital beds and hospital expenditures did increase. These increases 
simply were not sufficient to be statistically different from CON states. 
Further studies have confirmed some of Conover and Sloan’s conclusions. 
Additional work looked at acute care beds and hospital spending in CON compared to 
non-CON states. Researchers found that CON programs had a measureable impact on 
reducing the number of hospital beds, but not containing expenditures. Overall, CON 
states had 10% fewer beds per 100,000 residents when compared to states without CON 
regulations (Hellinger, 2009). While this was a statistically significant difference, the 
overall spending was not statistically different (though it was lower in states with CON 
laws). These findings validate Conover and Sloan’s earlier work around CON programs 
constraining hospital services, but not overall costs. 
While not directly related to cost, studies have also evaluated the impact of CON 
on hospital efficiencies (Ferrier, Leleu, & Valdmanis, 2009), (Rosko & Mutter, 2014). 
Efficiency was calculated on a state-by-state basis to eliminate any differences that could 
arise from other state regulations. The research shows that states with CON programs 
have more efficiency due to more concentrated levels of knowledge in hospitals (Ferrier 
et al., 2009). The research also shows that states without CON programs have more 
efficiency due to size of hospitals. Both of these findings corroborate previous findings 
around CON regulations constraining hospital bed growth. In CON states with fewer 




employment and use their skills. As such, they are more highly concentrated. On the 
other hand, hospitals with fewer beds have less negotiating power with suppliers and 
payors, leading to less efficient operations due to scale (Ferrier et al., 2009). The 
efficiencies experienced by hospitals in CON states outweighed the efficiencies in those 
states without CON programs, leading to the conclusion that some form of regulation on 
hospitals and healthcare systems does have a positive impact on efficiency, and as a 
proxy, costs (Ferrier et al., 2009). Further research into this topic using more recent data 
yielded similar results (Rosko & Mutter, 2014). This additional study demonstrates a 
positive correlation between CON programs and cost efficiency. Beyond the overall 
efficiency, hospitals in CON states had higher occupancy rates and a lower cost when 
adjusted for acuity. This did, however, result in smaller operating margins for hospitals in 
states with CON programs (Rosko & Mutter, 2014). This latest study provides key 
insights into the impact of CON regulations on hospital costs. 
Radiology Costs. Hospitals and other providers in the United States first 
purchased MRI scanners in the 1980s. The initial adaptation of MRI technology in 
hospitals was slower when compared to CT scanners due to the high capital cost of the 
technology and the lack of clear diagnostic advantage of an MRI when compared to CT. 
As such, the majority of early MRI scanners were either mobile units serving multiple 
locations or fixed units located in freestanding, for-profit imaging centers (Bell, 1996). 
The proliferation and adaptation of MRI technology continued with more advanced 
technology now available. Today, hospitals use MRI scans at a higher rate than in the 




2010). This growth demonstrates a substantial increase in utilization of MRI scanners and 
the need to better understand the costs associated with the technology. 
The cost for radiology procedures varies across the setting for care. Inpatient 
imaging studies are typically not separately reimbursed as most payors provide a bundled 
payment to the hospital for all services during an inpatient stay based on the patient’s 
diagnosis related group (DRG) at discharge. Outpatient imaging procedures, however, are 
paid on a fee-for-service basis and imaging centers and other radiology providers are free 
to determine their own charges. Due to this freedom in price setting, there is wide 
variation in charges and payments for the same service across the country. Studies have 
shown that not only to prices for knee MRIs differ in various regions across the country, 
but there are also some areas with wide differentials in price within localities (Pasalic et 
al., 2015). Pasalic and his colleagues found that quoted prices for a knee MRI ranged 
from $250 to $2,042 and that within localities there were variations in price from $0 (one 
area had no variation between all sites) and $1,592 for the exact same procedure. 
However, there was no variation in average price based on the region of the country in 
which the imaging center was located. These results indicate that there is no control on 
cost for radiological procedures and providers set their prices at whatever level they 
determine to be fair, but that there is some consistency for pricing across the country 
(Pasalic et al., 2015). 
Non-academic publications also anecdotally support the conclusion of wide 
ranging costs for MRI scans. Articles published in Forbes, Money, USA Today, and The 
Washington Post all back the conclusions of Pasalic anecdotally. Price ranges quoted in 




hospitals have higher prices (O'Donnell & Rudavsky, 2017), (Ashford, 2014). These 
articles rely on a modicum of research, but are much more readily accessible to 
consumers looking to reduce their health care spending than peer reviewed research. 
Some articles indicate patients may save money simply by forgoing their insurance 
completely (O'Donnell & Rudavsky, 2017); however, in certain circumstances, that could 
lead to charges of fraud. CMS’s Office of the Inspector General (OIG) issued guidance 
indicating that failure to collect required copayments or bill CMS for services rendered to 
Medicare beneficiaries constitutes fraud under the anti-kickback statute or the false 
claims act, or both (Brown, 1994). Patients and providers need to exercise caution when 
following the advice given by these news articles as to avoid violations in the pursuit of 
economic benefit. 
The literature suggests mixed results when determining the relative cost of an 
MRI scan relative to the overall cost of care for the episode of care (Beinfeld & Gazelle, 
2005), (Parker et al., 2008), (Kan et al., 2009), (DellaBadia, Bell, Keyes, Mathews, & 
Glazier, 2002), (Baker, 2010). Evidence suggests that increased usage of imaging can 
reduce overall cost by reducing length of stay (Beinfeld & Gazelle, 2005). In looking at a 
variety of relationships via a multivariate regression for inpatients, researchers found the 
largest driver of increased hospital cost was additional time spent in intensive care units. 
Each day in an intensive care unit averaged a cost of over $4000. By spending less than 
10% of that cost on additional imaging, the model indicated the ability to reduce length of 
stay by one day (Beinfeld & Gazelle, 2005). In this instance, MRI scans can be used to 




Some studies predict MRI utilization may be reduced as a diagnostic tool in favor 
of other, less costly modalities (Parker et al., 2008). Ultrasound is one possible alternative 
to MRI scans. A panel of three radiologists retrospectively analyzed de-identified patient 
records to determine whether the patient could have been diagnosed more accurately with 
MRI, more accurately diagnosed with ultrasound, or diagnosed equally as well with 
either modality. The findings demonstrate a substantial cost-saving potential to CMS with 
just under one-half of all cases examined having ultrasound deemed as accurate or more 
accurate than MRI in diagnosing the injury. Over a fourteen-year period, these savings 
could amount to nearly $7 billion in cost avoidance. However, in injuries occurring most 
frequently in the data set (meniscus disorder [n=592], rotator cuff disorder [n=551], 
arthritis [n=291], and fracture [n=233]), there is a limited or no ability to substitute MRI 
for ultrasound (Parker et al., 2008). As such, the savings may be limited to less common 
injuries and not represent an overall opportunity to reduce cost. 
A study in pediatric patients also found opportunities to lower the overall cost of 
care by increasing utilization of MRI scans (Kan et al., 2009). Pediatric patients 
presenting to the emergency department with signs and symptoms of a broken bone 
typically receive a diagnostic x-ray to determine if the bone is actually broken. In some 
cases, the x-ray is not sensitive enough to detect the fracture. In these cases, the patient 
would need to return and have additional testing and treatment at an increased cost. 
Researches devised a clinical pathway to incorporate MRI scans into the treatment of 
these patients. The results of the increased use of MRI for these patients allowed patients 
to receive more appropriate treatment initially and did not increase overall costs because 




MRI may also be used in lieu of even more expensive imaging modalities or other 
diagnostic modalities (DellaBadia et al., 2002). For patients with diagnosed epilepsy that 
may benefit from surgery, neurologists use a variety of diagnostic tests available to 
determine how well patients could benefit from surgery. Patients may undergo 
continuous EEG monitoring, WADA tests (a form of EEG where a hemisphere of the 
brain is chemically blocked to determine which hemisphere of the brain controls vital 
functions), MRI scans, PET scans, or a combination of any or all of the aforementioned 
exams. The combination of these tests is expensive for the patient, so researchers 
examined if a simpler battery of tests could provide the same accuracy at a reduced cost 
to the patient and the healthcare system. The study examined EEG, MRI, and PET scans 
as the options for determining surgical viability and found that EEG and MRI combined 
provided the best value for accuracy in predicting surgical viability (DellaBadia et al., 
2002). In this instance, although MRI is a more expensive study than an EEG, it was used 
as a cost deterrent compared to other, more expensive tests, such as PET scans. 
In contrast, other research draws opposing conclusions by demonstrating an 
increase in overall cost of care for MRI utilization. The study focuses on MRI scans 
performed on machines owned by orthopedic surgeons. In a time-based study, Baker 
found that physicians who owned MRI machines ordered scans at a rate 38% higher than 
those who did not. The increased scan rate led to higher spending over the entire episode 
of care (Baker, 2010). The data indicate that the increase in spending is not attributable to 
any changes in the demographics of orthopedic surgery patients or factors that orthopedic 
surgeons face by owning MRI scanners as opposed to any other physician or facility. 




when compared to scans performed on other machines (Amrhein et al., 2013). The 
authors speculate that physicians may have less stringent criteria for ordering MRI scans 
when the scan would take place on their owned MRI scanner. 
Use of Claims Data in Research 
Large data sources from public and private sources is crucial for health services 
research. The MarketScan database has been previously used by researchers for radiology 
research due to the comprehensive nature of the data (Nazarian et al., 2016). The dataset 
contains de-identified data at the individual claim level with information including the 
patient demographics, diagnosis and procedure codes, costs and payments made by the 
payors and patients, and dates of service. The commercial MarketScan database contains 
data from third-party payors that are both provided by employers and those plans 
purchased privately by beneficiaries (Breslin, Banerjee, Gust, & Birkmeyer, 2013). These 
claims cover both hospital and non-hospital encounters that cover any imaging location 
and the professional fee from a radiologist or other physician that performs the 
interpretation of the MRI if it was charged separately from a technical fee. 
One of the largest drawbacks of a third-party database is the potential for error to 
enter into the data. Since there are multiple data sources flowing into MarketScan and 
different plans require different information for payment processing, the data may not be 
standardized. Given the lack of an alternative and the previously demonstrated reliability 
of the dataset in research at large and specifically for MRI, the benefits of using 












 This study aims to determine if there is a linkage between CON regulations on 
MRI scanners and cost healthcare at both a micro and macro level, by examining the cost 
per MRI scan and the overall cost for MRI services. 
Study Design 
The study used a retrospective archival data analysis based on outpatient claims 
data from the United States. The data for this study are from Truven Health Analytics’ 
MarketScan commercial research database. Truven Health Analytics, now under the 
umbrella of IBM’s Watson division, provides de-identified patient level detailed records 
for commercial payors, Medicare Advantage, and Medicaid patients that include all 
administrative detail including payments made. The commercial dataset was chosen over 
other publically available data, such as Medicare or Medicaid data from CMS, due to the 
nature of healthcare reimbursement. Since CMS reimburses providers on a fee schedule, 
there is no significant variation in reimbursement amounts to providers for the same 
procedure. For commercial payors, providers have the ability to negotiate rates and set 
chargemaster prices to influence the amount of reimbursement received. The use of the 
commercial dataset will ensure that this variation is accounted for in the analysis. 
The hypotheses derived from the research questions will be evaluated by looking 
at the descriptive statistics through a means analysis and then performing a multivariate 




dependent variable (cost) while allowing the study to directly control for two variables 
that do impact cost: procedure type and state. Due to the unequal distribution of the 
populations, the data will necessarily be transformed as part of the regression 
calculations. These procedures will be run twice: first by aggregating the data only by 
type of CON requirement for MRI scanners and then by grouping the data by state first 
and treating each state with equal weight. 
The analyses will be performed by using SAS and tables and graphs will be 
compiled in Microsoft Excel. A p-value of <0.05 will demonstrate statistical significance 
for this study. 
Hypotheses 
 There are two research questions from one hypothesis for this study: one question 
focusing on micro costs and one focusing on macro costs. The first research question 
aims to analyze micro-level costs for MRI scans. This null hypothesis is that there is not a 
difference in per scan cost for MRI scans in states with CON regulations dealing directly 
with MRI scanners, in states with CON regulations that do not directly address MRI 
scanners, and states without CON regulations for MRI scanners and those states without 
CON statutes. The second research question looks at the macro level costs for MRI and 
can only be answered if the null hypothesis is disproven. The second hypothesis is that if 
the null hypothesis is disproven and there is a difference in cost between the three groups, 
overall spending will be higher in states without CON restrictions on MRI scanners. This 
hypothesis would support previous studies that found higher spending for patients seeing 




Population and Sample 
 The population for this study includes all patients contained within the Truven 
Health Analytics’ MarketScan database who had an MRI scan in 2016. The population 
will then be narrowed down to those patients who receive an MRI for an upper extremity 
joint, either a shoulder, elbow, or a wrist based on the CPT procedure codes as shown in 
Table 1. These scans were chosen for two main reasons. First, these are scans that are 
commonly performed on a routine basis and should have sufficient volume from which to 
draw conclusions. Second, these scans are performed in all care settings, thereby 
eliminating variation in cost due to site of care. This second reason also ruled out the use 
of lower joint scans as injuries to lower limbs have a higher rate of visits to higher acuity 
of settings due to these injuries impacting the ability to bear weight. 
Table 1. List of CPT Codes Used to Identify Upper Extremity Joint MRI Scans 
CPT Code CPT Description 
73221 Magnetic resonance imaging, upper extremity joint without contrast 
material 
73222 Magnetic resonance imaging, upper extremity joint with contrast material 
73223 Magnetic resonance imaging, upper extremity joint without and with 
contrast material 
 
 The remaining claims will then be separated into three categories based on the 
state in which the scan was performed to evaluate the impact of any CON regulations on 
the cost of the scan. A list of states and the categories is shown in Table 2 and the 









Table 2. States by Type of CON Program 
Category 1: States with 
directly applicable MRI 
CON Statutes 
Category 2: States with 
indirectly applicable CON 
statutes to MRI projects 
Category 3: States without 
CON programs and states 
without CON requirements 





North Carolina, Rhode 
Island, Tennessee, 
Vermont, Virginia, West 
Virginia 
Alabama, Alaska, 
Delaware, District of 
Columbia, Georgia, 
Illinois, Iowa, Maine, 
Maryland, Mississippi, 
Montana, New York, 
South Carolina 
Arizona, Arkansas, 
California, Colorado, Florida, 
Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, 
Louisiana, Minnesota, 
Nebraska, Nevada, New 
Hampshire, New Jersey, New 
Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, 
Oklahoma, Oregon, 
Pennsylvania, South Dakota, 




 The variables described below allow for variations due to patient characteristics to 
be controlled. The independent variable will be state as a proxy for presence of CON 
regulations for MRI services with 0 representing states that explicitly address MRI 
scanners in the CON statutes, 1 representing states that have CON programs that could 
potentially impact MRI projects, and 2 for states where the CON program does not 
govern MRI at all and those states without CON programs. The categorization of states 
into these three groups is contained in Table 2. The control variables will be use of 
contrast dye, bill type, provider network status, insurance plan type, urban or rural 
location, and facility type. By controlling for these variables in the methodology, any 
variation should be due to differences in CON regulations and not due to any other 
external factor. Additionally, the cost of the scan as reported in the MarketScan database 
will be adjusted according to the Bureau of Economic Analysis Regional Price Parities 
(2016) by state to eliminate any differences due to cost of living or cost of labor in 




services to eliminate any variation in pricing due to housing costs or the cost of goods. 
These data will be merged into the patient level record based on the state of residence. 
Exclusion Criteria 
 Records where the net payment for the MRI is less than $0.01 will be excluded to 
eliminate any claims where cost data are not available or not valid or where the patient 
was eligible for charity care. Additionally, any patients under age 18 will be excluded due 
to the increased use of sedation during pediatric imaging procedures (Mason et al., 2008). 
This additional cost for pediatric patients could bias the data in whichever state has more 
pediatric scans. 
Limitations 
 The largest limitation in the study is the use of administrative data. The Truven 
Health Analytics’ MarketScan database relies on secondary administrative data, which 
have been coded based on the primary information. The nature of the data introduce 
chances for error based on coding at either the site where the study was ordered, the site 
where the study was performed, or the site where the payment was made. Additionally, 
the main purpose of the codes analyzed in this study is billing. Since these codes are not 
primarily designed for research purposes, they may not have the accuracy necessary for 
researchers. By limiting the codeset to the specific CPT codes for certain MRI scans, 
there is a chance that scans that imaged a larger portion of the body, including the 
shoulder, may be excluded even if those scans were used to diagnose a musculoskeletal 
injury. However, those scans most likely were ordered for injuries beyond a shoulder 














The MarketScan dataset contained a total of 275,023 records that met the criteria 
described in Chapter 3 to be included in the analysis. Data use agreements prohibit the 
disclosure of data identified by state; however, Figure 1 displays the mean payment value 
between states with the states being deidentified, Table 3 contains the number of records 
by state while Figure 2 shows the mean payment amounts for each state according to the 
CON category. The number of records in the dataset ranges from a minimum of 28 in 
Hawai’i to a maximum of 22,428 in Texas. The mean payment values by state range from 
a minimum of $323 in the state with the lowest mean payment to $1,636 in the state with 
the highest mean payment value. 
































Alabama 4,996  Montana 318 
Alaska 293  Nebraska 888 
Arizona 3,983  Nevada 1,700 
Arkansas 1,896  New Hampshire 882 
California 15,108  New Jersey 6,366 
Colorado 4,089  New Mexico 616 
Connecticut 2,309  New York 21,497 
Delaware 1,478  North Carolina 7,437 
District of Columbia 142  North Dakota 148 
Florida 16,206  Ohio 14,041 
Georgia 11,123  Oklahoma 4,763 
Hawaii 28  Oregon 2,607 
Idaho 4,753  Pennsylvania 8,328 
Illinois 8,244  Rhode Island 523 
Indiana 6,287  South Carolina 14,836 
Iowa 1,640  South Dakota 325 
Kansas 2,308  Tennessee 7,687 
Kentucky 7,041  Texas 22,428 
Louisiana 14,761  Utah 2,310 
Maine 504  Vermont 167 
Maryland 2,851  Virginia 5,158 
Massachusetts 5,561  Washington 5,375 
Michigan 12,343  West Virginia 745 
Minnesota 2,315  Wisconsin 4,598 
Mississippi 3,293  Wyoming 382 












Figure 2. Unadjusted Mean Payment Amount by State by CON Category 
 
Research Question 1 
The null hypothesis for the first research question, that there is no variation in cost 
between directly regulated CON states, indirectly regulated CON states, and unregulated 
CON states, is potentially disproven by the results. 
Means. The initial analysis of taking the mean of payment for the three categories 
is shown in Table 4.  
Table 4. Unadjusted Mean Payment Amount by CON Group 
CON Group N Mean Payment Amount 
Direct 56,345 $529 
Indirect 71,215 $542 
None 147,463 $635 
 
The mean payment amount for states with directly applicable statutes for MRI 
scanners is $529, while the mean payment amount for states with indirectly applicable 
CON statutes for MRI scanners is $567 and the mean payment amount for states without 
any applicable CON regulations is $605. This initial analysis demonstrates that the means 























measurement as to the magnitude of the difference and whether or not the difference is 
significant. 
The second means test groups the records by state and then took the mean of the 
mean payment amount for each state. This aimed to eliminate any variation in the data 
caused by the varying magnitude in the number of records for each state. As such, there 
are only 51 records in this analysis, one each for each state and the District of Colombia. 
The results are summarized in Table 5. 
Table 5. Unadjusted Mean Payment Amount by State and CON Group 
CON Group N Mean Payment Amount 
Direct 12 $618 
Indirect 13 $646 
None 26 $624 
 
 The mean payment amount when treating each state equally irrespective of the 
number of records yields different results than analyzing the records in totality. Directly 
regulated states now have a mean payment amount of $618 while indirectly regulated 
states have a mean of $646 and states with no CON regulations for MRI scanners have a 
mean payment of $624. As with the previous means analysis, no statistical tests were 
performed to determine whether the differences were significant. 
Controlling for Procedure. The first regression analysis controls for the type of 
procedure, specifically whether the MRI scan was with contrast, without contrast, or was 
both with and without contrast. The model is not biased based on the distribution of the 
data (scaled deviance/degree of freedom = 1.12). Using the least squares means test to 
adjust for the specific procedure, the mean changes compared to the simple means test. 
The regression provides means of $634 (p<0.0001) for directly regulated states, $681 




To ensure the values are significantly different, the analysis also uses the 95% 
confidence intervals for the calculated mean payment amounts. These ranges are shown 
in Figure 3. 
Figure 3. Mean Payment when Controlling for Procedure (95% CI) 
 
 The analysis was run again by using the mean payment amount for each state in 
lieu of the payment for each individual records. Unlike the first analysis, there was no 
statistical difference between the three groups with the directly regulated states and 
unregulated states having p-values of 0.78 and 0.66 when compared to the indirectly 
regulated states respectively.  
Controlling for Procedure and State. The second regression analysis controls 
for both procedure type and state. This will remove any variation due to the resources 






















each state. As with the previous model, the regression isn’t biased due to the gamma 
distribution (scaled deviance/degree of freedom = 1.12). This model also produces means 
that are different from the simple means analysis. The mean payment for directly 
regulated states is $638 (p<0.0001), while the mean payment for indirectly regulated 
states is $678 (p<0.0001), and the mean payment for unregulated states is $726 
(p<0.0001).  
Figure 4 contains these calculated mean values with the 95% confidence intervals 
for each group of states. 
























 With the confidence intervals not overlapping for any values in either analysis, 
the study concludes that the costs for MRI scans in each of the different groups is 
different with at least 95% confidence. 
 As shown in Figure 5, there is substantial variation within the three groups. 
Directly regulated CON states range from the second lowest to the second highest mean 
payment amount while indirectly regulated states have the highest mean payment 
amount. Due to this variation, some of the conclusions drawn at the aggregate level may 
be due to variations within the CON group rather than the effect of CON regulations. A 
map showing states by quartile is included in the appendix and the variation in payment 
are shown in Figures 6 through 8 below. 
































Figure 6. Mean Payment by State for Directly Regulated States Controlling for 
Procedure and State Purchasing Power 
 
Figure 7. Mean Payment for Indirectly Regulated States Controlling for Procedure and 


















































Figure 8. Mean Payment for Unregulated States Controlling for Procedure and State 
Purchasing Power 
 
Research Question 2 
 The second research question could only be answered if the null hypothesis was 
disproven. Since there are differences between the three groups, the second research 
question can be addressed. The null hypothesis for the second research question, that 
costs for states with direct CON regulations for MRI scanners will be higher than costs 
for states with indirect CON regulations for MRI scanners, which in turn will both be 
higher than states without CON programs or with CON programs which do not impact 
MRI scanner projects, is potentially disproven. 
 Table 6 summarizes the findings from the analyses performed to answer the first 
research question. 
Table 6. Summary of Analysis Results 
Statistical Test Direct Indirect None 
Means in Aggregate $529 $542 $605 
Means by State $618 $646 $624 
Control for Procedure $634 $681 $726 
Control for Procedure by State* $606 $626 $599 
Control for Procedure and State Purchasing Power $638 $678 $726 





















 In all of the analyses performed by aggregating all the data, the group of states 
with explicit requirements to obtain a certificate of need for MRI scanner projects had the 
lowest cost per procedure. Moreover, those states with indirect requirements also had 
lower costs than unregulated states, though the costs were higher compared to states with 
directly applicable requirements. However, when each state is weighted equally, the 
difference between the three groups is eliminated. As such, the study concludes that there 
may be variation in cost for an MRI scan based on certificate of need requirements and 












Discussion of the Results 
 Certificate of need programs purport to contain cost for medical services by not 
allowing unnecessary duplication (Parento, 2017). This study estimated the mean 
payment amount as a proxy for cost for MRI scans of an upper extremity joints by state. 
The states were then grouped by their CON requirements surrounding MRI scanner 
projects: those with directly applicable to MRI scanners, those with indirectly applicable 
requirements for MRI projects, and those states with CON programs that do not impact 
MRI scanners and those states without CON statutes. 
 Three analyses were performed. First, a comparison of the unadjusted means were 
calculated. The analysis was performed twice: first by analyzing all records in each CON 
category and then by grouping the data first by state and only analyzing state results. This 
showed that the costs among all groups were different, but did not include any 
information about the magnitude or significance of those differences. Next, a multivariate 
analysis of the data to control for the different procedures was performed. Again, it was 
performed twice – once based on all data and once based on state level results. Finally, 
another multivariate was performed to control for both the different procedures and the 
state in which the patient lived. In all analyses performed on the unaggregated data, the 
cost for MRI scans in those states with directly applicable statutes for MRI projects was 




groups were lower than the combined group of states without CON programs and those 
states with CON programs that do not relate to MRI projects. However, when the data 
were grouped by state and each state was given equal weight irrespective of the number 
of records included in the dataset, there was no difference between any of the CON 
groups. 
 There are multiple reasons to use this type of analysis in order to determine 
comparative costs. First, the analysis allows the study to control for variables that may 
impact cost. The three different procedure types for MRI scans of an upper extremity 
joint (without contrast, with contrast, and both with and without contrast) require 
different resources to complete and the combined scan requires two different images. The 
state in which the scan was performed may also impact the cost of the scan. By 
controlling for state purchasing power, any differences due to cost of living differences 
and other economic factors based on state are accurately accounted for. 
 Second, by grouping states with similar CON requirements together, it eliminates 
any potential bias based on differences in one individual state that may not otherwise be 
accounted for in the statistical model. If a given state has other requirements around MRI 
scanners, such as a licensure moratorium on new MRI scanners that is separate and 
distinct from certificate of need, that variance would be balanced out by the other states 
in the grouping. This may also explain why the results are different when states are 
weighted equally. Variances would be amplified by not allowing the magnitude of the 
records to factor into the calculations. 
 Contrary to the findings of the FTC and DOJ (Lao et al., 2015) and others who 




unit basis for MRI scans of upper extremity joints in states with directly applicable CON 
requirements. There are a multitude of reasons this may be true. First, fixed costs per scan 
increase when there are more MRI scanners in service (Lexa, Mehta, & Seidmann, 2005). 
Assuming that the market for MRI scans is not dependent on the number of MRI 
scanners, each scanner would perform fewer scans per scanner. Due to the decreased 
volumes, the cost per scan would necessarily increase in order to recoup the necessary 
fixed costs of owning and maintaining an MRI scanner. 
 Beyond fixed costs, labor costs also factor into the overall cost for MRI services. 
If the supply of MRI scanners is not restricted and open to the free market, there would 
be additional demand for labor to operate the incremental number of scanners. Increased 
demand for labor can lead to increased staffing costs as MRI technicians can demand 
higher salaries (Leibenhaut, 2005). 
 The study also found that even CON programs with indirectly applicable 
requirements for MRI programs resulted in lower costs on a per-unit basis than states 
without CON programs and those states with CON requirements that do not apply to MRI 
scanner projects. Some of the same conclusions that apply to directly regulated states can 
also apply to these states as unnecessary duplication may be limited. The higher costs 
when compared to states with directly applicable requirements to obtain a CON for an 
MRI scanner could be due to the ability to acquire MRI scanners without a CON. By not 
strictly regulating the supply of MRI scanners, these states may not gain all of the 
efficiencies of scale when compared to those states which do have explicit CON 





 The largest limitation in the study is the varying number of records in each state. 
When the analyses were run giving equal weight to each state regardless of the number of 
records, the results were different compared to the analyses run on the dataset as a whole. 
There could be irregularities in the data in those states with fewer records that are not 
offset by other records in the state. This could lead to skewed results in the state level 
analyses.  
This study takes advantage of Truven Health Analytics’ MarketScan commercial 
payor database. As this dataset does not contain records for Medicare or Medicaid 
patients, the conclusions reached in this study may not be applicable to those patient 
populations. Furthermore, because the dataset does not represent the overall market for 
MRI scans, no conclusions can be drawn around utilization of MRI scanners in each state 
nor the overall cost of MRI services based on utilization at a macro level. 
 As stated previously, these administrative data are used primarily for billing 
purposes. This leads to potential sources of error if providers do not file claims in a 
timely manner, do not record the revenue received to the correct account, or do not record 
the revenue to the correct procedure. The data also do not contain any information 
regarding potentially applicable charity care policies that may have reduced the payment 
amount. 
Future Research 
 Future research into this topic could continue on a variety of paths. Studies could 
continue to evaluate other health care services that are commonly regulated by certificate 




beds. Research could also continue into MRI costs to determine if the conclusions 
reached by this study hold true for other populations, such as the Medicare enrollees, or if 
the lower per-unit cost for MRI scans is offset by higher utilization, which may 
ultimately lead to higher overall costs for care. 
Conclusions and Implications 
 The findings of the study of both direct and indirect CON regulations for MRI 
scanners present opportunities for legislators to reevaluate the efficacy of certificate of 
need programs as part of efforts to reform the health care system. As legislators at both a 
state and federal level attempt to control the continuing rise of health care costs and 
spending, CON programs may indeed offer some of the benefits initially hoped for when 
NHPRDA was first passed. 
Summary 
 Health care costs have risen exponentially and now represent nearly 18% of the 
United States gross domestic product (Martin et al., 2019). Certificate of need programs 
were initially designed to help contain costs. This study finds that CON regulations result 
in lower costs per scan even if the requirements are not specific to MRI projects. Policy 
makers should evaluate the potential cost savings of these programs against the barriers 












Table A1. CON Statutes and Regulations by State Relating to MRI Projects 
State Statute/Regulation 
Alabama Code of Alabama 22-21-263(a)(2) 
Alaska 7 AAC 01.0001 
Connecticut C.G.S. Sec. 19a-638(10) 
Delaware 16 Del C. §9305 
District of Columbia D.C. Code § 44-401(6B)(A) 
Georgia O.C.G.A. § 31-6-40(a)(3) 
Hawai’i HRS § 323D-12 
Illinois 20 ILCS 3960 
Iowa Code of Iowa Chapter 135.61 
Kentucky KRS 216B.061(f) 
Maine 22 M.R.S.A. §328(16) 
Maryland COMAR 10.24.01.02.A.5 
Massachusetts M.G.L. c. 111, §§ 25C 
Michigan Mich. Comp. Laws § 333.22209(1)(c) 
Mississippi MS Code § 41-7-191(1)(d)(xii) 
Missouri 19 CSR 60-50.300 (11)(E) 
Montana Mont. Code Ann. § 50-5-301(a) 
New York 10 NYCRR Section 710.1(c)(3) 
North Carolina N.C.G.S. § 131E-176(16)(f1)(7) 
Rhode Island 216-RICR-40-10-22.2(A)(20)(i) 
South Carolina S.C. Code An. Regs. 61-15.102(1)(f) 
Tennessee TN Code § 68-11-1607(a)(4) 
Vermont 18 V.S.A. § 9405 (CON Standard 3.5) 
Virginia Va. Code § 32.1-102.1 
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